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This page archives NTRU articles, technical reports and tutorials which have been superseded by other results. They are preserved here for convenience and historical interest and do not necessarily represent current thinking within NTRU. NTRU Articles
PASS PASS (Polynomial Authentication and Signature Scheme) is a signature and authentication scheme based on partial polynomial evaluation.Polynomial Rings and Efficient Public Key Authentication Format: Postscript | PDF Polynomial Rings and Efficient Public Key Authentication II Format: PDF MiniPASS: Authentication and Digital Signatures in a Constrained Environment Format: PDF NSS NSS (the NTRU Signature Scheme) is a signature scheme based in the NTRU lattice. It was broken by Craig Gentry and Mike Szydlo. See our scrutiny page for more details. NSS: The NTRU Signature Scheme Format: PDF The NTRU Signature Scheme: Theory and Practice Format: TeX | DVI | Postscript | PDF NTRU Tech Note #017: Enhanced Encoding and Verification Methods for the NTRU Signature Scheme Format: TeX | DVI | Postscript | PDF NTRU Tutorials A tutorial outlining PASS. NTRU Technical Reports Techical Reports 7 and 15 have been superseded by Technical Report 16. NTRU Report 007. Plaintext Awareness and the NTRU PKCS. RSA and Bell Labs have recently announced a potential attack on certain public key protocols, along with several suggested countermeasures. The most secure of these countermeasures uses the concept of plaintext aware, which means that it should be infeasible to construct a valid ciphertext without knowing the corresponding plaintext. Failure to be plaintext aware may open a cryptosystem to various sorts of attacks. In this note we describe some potential attacks on the NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) analogous to the attack described in the RSA and Bell Labs reports and suggest the use of an OAEP digital envelope to eliminate the threat of such attacks. Note: This report has been superseded by Tecni Format: TeX | PDF NTRU Report 015. Reaction Attacks Against the NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem. Hall, Goldberg, and Schneier have proposed a Reaction Attack against several public key cryptosystems based on lattice problems, including the McEliece, Ajtai-Dwork, and Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi cryptosystems. In this note we describe a Reaction Attack on the NTRU public key cryptosystem and describe a number of ways in which such attacks may be easily detected and thwarted. Note for Technical Report 015 Version 2: The countermeasures described in this report are largely superseded by NTRU Technical Report 016, "Protecting NTRU Against Chosen Ciphertext and Reaction Attacks". The report 016 describes a padding technique of Fujisaki and Okamoto that protects against reaction attacks and also against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks described in NTRU Technical Report 007 and in the paper "A chosen-ciphertext attack against NTRU", E. Jaulmes and A.Joux, Proceedings of Crypto 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag. Format: PDF
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